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## Africa Review

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Botswana - South Africa: Mutual Concern Over  
Guerrilla Activity

Several terrorist incidents late last month in the northern Transvaal have prompted recent articles in the South African press expressing concern over Botswana's growing potential for becoming a staging area for guerrilla activities directed against South Africa. In turn, the Botswanan Government, already nervous about Rhodesian accusations of complicity in aiding the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) forces in Botswana, has given both private and public assurances to Pretoria that its policy of denying guerrillas the use of Botswanan territory for transit or sanctuary remains in force.

The Botswanan Government has recently taken several measures to strengthen its effort to stop guerrillas from transiting Botswana. Suspected or known members of South African liberation movements arriving in the country are to be kept under police surveillance. In addition, because the authorities suspect that the guerrillas who clashed with South African police last month were members of the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa and were traveling on Tanzanian passports, the border post at Kazungula has been closed to holders of Tanzanian passports. Botswanan authorities also believe the ANC guerrillas received arms and assistance from ZAPU members in the Selebi-Pikwe area where there is a large Rhodesian refugee camp that consists mainly of ZAPU followers. In a development that may be related to Botswana's concern regarding ZAPU involvement with South African insurgents, the government has ordered the ZAPU representative in Francistown out of the country. Finally, in an effort to curb ZAPU guerrillas, the Botswana police appear to have increased patrolling in the salient where the borders of Botswana, Rhodesia, and Zambia meet.

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President Khama has often openly voiced his concern over the danger to Botswana of becoming a major staging area for guerrillas operating against South Africa and Rhodesia, and he has reiterated that his government's policy is to prevent both open and clandestine transit of insurgents. His fears have undoubtedly been sharpened by the South African retaliatory attacks into Zambia and Angola earlier this year and by the recent Rhodesian raids into Zambia. Because of Botswana's meager security forces, the government's ability to prevent the movement of guerrillas into and out of the country is limited. As a result, Botswanan officials constantly reassure the neighboring white governments that they are taking every measure possible to prevent incidents along their common borders.

One factor that could complicate relations with Botswana's white ruled neighbors, however, is the unofficial logistic support that ANC and ZAPU insurgents reportedly receive from Botswanan troops. Although we have only fragmentary information thus far, sympathy within the military toward the insurgents allegedly extends as high as President Khama's son, Brigadier Ian Khama, deputy commander of the defense force. [REDACTED]

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Thus far there have been no clear indications of the extent of the assistance being given to ZAPU, or that the military is seriously at odds with the government's policy on this issue.

The South African Government seems to recognize Khama's difficult position and has acted with restraint when border incidents have occurred. When a black government eventually comes to power in Rhodesia, Botswana will undoubtedly be caught up in regional efforts to support the struggle against South Africa. In time, the government could find itself faced with increased insurgent activity mounted from Botswana against the Pretoria government, thereby jeopardizing Botswana's vital economic ties to South Africa and inviting military retaliation. (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)

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USSR-Ethiopia: Friendship Treaty

The Soviet-Ethiopian friendship treaty, which was signed in Moscow on 20 November, parallels the treaties the Soviet Union has signed with other Third World states. The treaty provides for continued military cooperation but does not contain a mutual defense arrangement. There have been a number of irritants in Soviet-Ethiopian relations in recent months, and the speed with which Brezhnev and Mengistu reached agreement on the treaty suggests that both sides made concessions.

The military provisions of the treaty are similar to those contained in the treaties with Angola and Mozambique but are less detailed than those in the now abrogated treaty with Somalia. Article 7 of the Ethiopian treaty calls for mutual consultation and a coordinated response in the event of a threat to peace. Article 10 notes that the Soviet Union and Ethiopia will continue to cooperate in the military sphere, which presumably legitimizes current Soviet support facilities in Ethiopia. The treaty with Somalia contained these general provisions but went on to commit the Soviet Union to train Somali military personnel to improve Somalia's "defense capability."

Political aspects of the treaty are just as significant. In the treaty, Moscow formally recognized Ethiopia as a socialist state, which suggests that Mengistu agreed to continue his efforts to form a Marxist-Leninist party. Moscow has pressed Mengistu for some time to form such a party to give his regime at least the semblance of civilian rule.

While Ethiopia's acceptance of the treaty, which Moscow has sought and Mengistu has resisted, indicates an Ethiopian concession, Addis Ababa nonetheless preserved room to maneuver in foreign affairs by securing Soviet agreement to respect the principles of the Organization of African Unity and the nonaligned movement as the basis

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of Ethiopian foreign policy. Treaty references to territorial integrity and inviolability point to continued Soviet support for Ethiopian goals in Eritrea and may even presage an expanded Soviet role in Eritrea. Mengistu may have felt that a show of Soviet support at this time would have an important psychological impact on both friends and enemies.

Like most Soviet treaties with Third World countries this one calls for closer economic, political, and cultural cooperation. The treaty is valid for 20 years and is automatically renewable for five year periods.  
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Nigeria: Stance on Rhodesia

Nigeria apparently has temporarily deferred plans to send an army battalion for Zambia's defense while it tries to persuade other African states to join it in committing a limited number of troops, if possible under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity. The arrival of Nigerian troops alone would not deter Rhodesian raids into Zambia, but it could further complicate prospects for a peaceful Rhodesian settlement, particularly if Nigerian troops were caught up in the fighting. The Nigerians are prepared to take risks, but they may be underestimating the complications that could stem from the presence of their own and perhaps other African troops in Zambia.

The Nigerians, who have backed Western initiatives in southern Africa, have not yet judged the UK-US proposals for a Rhodesian settlement to be totally fruitless. Lagos, however, clearly believes that hopes for an all-parties conference have nearly run out, and that this leaves it little alternative but to support an intensified guerrilla war and to consider alternative diplomatic efforts.

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Ethiopian Chairman Mengistu came away from discussions in Lagos last week with the impression that Nigerian Head of State Obasanjo is convinced that further negotiations concerning both Rhodesia and Namibia are futile. Moreover, he said that Obasanjo is almost ready to state publicly that Western countries are demonstrating ambiguity and a lack of determination.

Nigeria's attempt to drum up increased African support for Zambia reflects its deep commitment to black majority rule as well as the belief that to support its claims to leadership in Africa Lagos must take the initiative. The Nigerians are also apprehensive about the prospect of a substantially increased Soviet and Cuban role in the Rhodesian situation, and they prefer that Africans--despite their limited means--do more to assist the beleaguered frontline states like Zambia.

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It is unclear how many African countries Nigeria has approached, but Sierra Leone and Uganda are among them and reportedly are considering Nigeria's proposal to help assist Zambia. We do not know the attitude of the frontline states toward the idea of putting a collective African military force in Zambia or whether in fact Zambia has given final assent to the presence even of Nigerian troops. These troops, which would be used in a strictly border defense role, would give a welcome psychological boost to Zambia, but it is doubtful that a battalion would help much against Rhodesian raids. Zambian President Kaunda might thus conclude that there would be more risks than benefits in a Nigerian or a broader African military presence, particularly if this made the Rhodesians even more unwilling to negotiate and if it increased the risk of an expanded war--something Kaunda greatly fears.

In the immediate future, Nigerian attitudes toward Rhodesia and southern Africa generally are likely to be heavily shaped by the developments in Namibia. US failure to support some economic sanctions against South Africa, should Pretoria reject the UN settlement plan for Namibia, would almost certainly cause a setback to improved Nigerian-US relations and could spill over to affect Nigerian diplomatic cooperation with the United States in search of a Rhodesian settlement.

Although Nigeria is becoming more actively and directly involved in the Rhodesian problem, we have no evidence that it is contemplating a major military role, which its own growing economic constraints would seem to rule out. Nor are there signs that Lagos is ready at this point to initiate--without prior approval by the frontline states--any new diplomatic strategy based on the premise that the Anglo-American proposals are dead.  
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CHADUSSR: President Malloum, who visited France last week, has decided to replace a 29-man Soviet medical assistance program--part of a relatively modest Soviet aid effort in Chad--with French personnel. Moscow has reacted by canceling plans for the return of some 60 Soviet teachers, doctors, and other technicians still on summer vacation; another 30 are still in Chad pending further developments. Thus far, there has been no indication the Chadian leader is considering canceling the remainder of Moscow's aid effort, which includes planned deliveries next year of ammunition and some outdated combat equipment. Malloum's decision emanates from a longstanding dispute with Moscow over how much the financially strapped Chadian Government should pay for Soviet help. The issue has held up negotiations on a new aid package since last January. Moscow's minimal demands are considerably more expensive than the aid provided by Paris, Chad's principal overseas donor and major military benefactor. Malloum has shown increasing interest in recent months in lining up development assistance to revive Chad's war- and drought-ravaged economy. Besides Paris, Malloum recently visited Peking where he negotiated both economic and military agreements. He plans future visits to Bonn, Brussels, and several Arab countries. (SECRET) [REDACTED] /ORPA, [REDACTED]

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